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MINNESOTA APPLIES COMPARATIVE FAULT TO
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
[Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986)]
INTRODUCTION
In Florenzano v. Olson,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
Minnesota's Comparative Fault Act2 applies to claims for negligent
misrepresentation.3 A plaintiff who is injured by a combination of a
negligent misrepresentation and the plaintiff's own negligence will
now4 have his tort recovery reduced by the percentage of fault attrib-
uted to the plaintiff.5 The Minnesota Supreme Court sees no reason
to distinguish negligent misrepresentation from the wide variety of
other claims to which comparative fault applies. 6
This Comment will examine the Florenzano decision by summariz-
ing the facts and issues of the case as well as the applicable law. Par-
ticular emphasis will be placed upon the majority opinion's rationale
and the concurring opinion, which urges a broader application of the
Florenzano holding. This Comment concludes that the basic holding
of the case is correct but the suggestion to extend comparative fault
to other forms of misrepresentation is not.
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The supreme court held that negligent misrepresentation claims
are subject to comparative fault. In order to analyze the court's deci-
sion, a brief summary of Minnesota's comparative fault law and Min-
nesota's misrepresentation law will be provided. Specifically, the
scope of application of the Comparative Fault Act and the distinction
between intentional and unintentional misrepresentation will be
overviewed.
1. 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986).
2. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1986).
3. For a discussion of negligent misrepresentation, see infra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text.
4. Prior to the Florenzano decision, contributory neglience was a complete bar to
recovery under a negligent misrepresentation theory. See Florenzano v. Olson, 358
N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The court of appeals spoke in terms of unrea-
sonable reliance rather than contributory negligence, but the effect of either was to
completely bar plaintiff's recovery. See id. at 176.
5. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
6. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 176.
1
Koziol: Minnesota Applies Comparative Fault to Negligent Misrepresentatio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
A. Comparative Fault: Scope of Application
Under common law, a plaintiff who was found to be contributorily
negligent was barred from recovering in tort against the defendant.7
This bar occurred even though the plaintiff suffered considerable in-
juries and the defendant was also in some measure negligent. 8 Con-
versely, if the plaintiff was not found to be contributorily negligent,
the plaintiff recovered all of his tort damages despite the fact that he
may have contributed to the injury just short of the point at which a
finding of contributory negligence would be justified. Thus, both
the defendant and the plaintiff were faced with an undesirable "all-
or-nothing" situation under the contributory negligence rule. In es-
sence, the plaintiff may recover all of his damages in situations where
such a result is unfair to the defendant or, alternatively, the plaintiff
may recover nothing in situations equally unfair to the plaintiff.
In 1969, the Minnesota legislature responded to the harshness and
rigidity of the contributory negligence rule by enacting Minnesota's
first comparative negligence statute. 9 The new statute avoided the
"all-or-nothing" problem by reducing rather than barring the plain-
tiff's recovery. The factfinder apportions fault among the various
parties and the plaintiff's recovery is then reduced by his share of the
fault.1o Under the current version of the statute, plaintiff's recovery
continues to be completely barred only if plaintiff's share of fault
exceeds the fault of the party "against whom recovery is sought.""l
As originally enacted, the comparative negligence statute only ap-
plied to causes of action sounding in negligence.12 The statute's
7. The elements of contributory negligence are want of ordinary care on the
part of the injured person and proximate cause. See Hacker v. Berkner, 263 Minn.
278, 284, 117 N.W.2d 13, 18 (1962); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59, 69, 81
N.W.2d 247, 253 (1957); Ballweber v. Kleist, 248 Minn. 102, 113-14, 78 N.W.2d 671,
677 (1956); see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON TORTS § 65 (5th ed. 1984). The most commonly accepted modification of the
rule concerning contributory negligence is the doctrine of last clear chance. W. KEE-
TON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 65 (5th ed.
1984); see, e.g., Gill v. Minneapolis, St. Paul, Rochester & Dubuque Elec. Traction Co.,
129 Minn. 142, 143, 151 N.W. 896, 897 (1915) (if defendant had last clear opportu-
nity to avoid the harm, plaintiff's negligence is not the proximate cause of injury).
8. See, e.g., Wolfson Car Leasing Co. v. Weberg, 200 Neb. 420, 264 N.W.2d 178
(1978) (opinion indicates that both parties were in some measure at fault).
9. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1067, 1069 (formerly
codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1971)); see infra note 12 for text of statute.
10. Minnesota currently has a modified comparative fault act in which recovery is
precluded only if the plaintiff's fault exceeds the fault of the party against whom
recovery is sought. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1984); see also Steenson, The
Fault With Comparative Fault: The Problem of Individual Comparisons in a Modified Compara-
tive Fault Jurisdiction, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
11. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1986).
12. The original statute provided:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or
[Vol. 13
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scope of application has since been significantly expanded. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota legislature have accom-
plished this in three ways. First, the supreme court has applied the
statute to certain claims which are not traditional negligence actions.
Specifically, the court has held that comparative negligence applies
to strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,' 3 and to actions based upon statutory violations or "negli-
gence per se."' 4 Second, and more significantly, the legislature
amended the statute in 197815 and changed the "comparative negli-
gence" statute to a "comparative fault" statute. A broad definition
of "fault" was adopted which includes a wide variety of culpable con-
duct as well as negligence.16 Third, the legislature has made certain
statutory causes of action expressly subject to the act. One example
of this is Minnesota's Dram Shop Statute.' 7
Despite the trend in Minnesota toward applying comparative fault
to an increasingly wide range of conduct,18 comparative fault has
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death
or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering .... When there are two or more
persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in propor-
tion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, how-
ever, that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award.
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1969) (amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 38, 1978
Minn. Laws 836).
13. Busch v. Busch Constr. Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977) (compara-
tive fault applies to a products liability action under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A).
14. See, e.g., Scott v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 256 N.W.2d 485 (Minn.
1977) (court allows jury to apportion fault where plaintiff's fault is ordinary negli-
gence and defendant's fault is based upon non-absolute statutory liability). But see
Trail v. Village of Elk River, 286 Minn. 380, 175 N.W.2d 916 (1970) (if plaintiff's
injury is caused by precisely the type of conduct the statute prohibits and if the plain-
tiff is a member of the class for whom the statute's protection is intended, compara-
tive negligence and contributory negligence do not apply).
15. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1986)).
16. The 1978 version of the Act provided:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, mis-
use of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the
basis for liability and to contributory fault.
Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. Ia (1984)).
17. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 3 (1986).
18. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
1987]
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consistently been held inapplicable to intentional torts.19 The tradi-
tional rationale for this rule is that intentional conduct is qualitatively
different from contributory negligence and, therefore, an intentional
wrongdoer should not be permitted to pass a portion of the loss on
to a plaintiff/victim who is merely negligent.20 Although this abso-
lute rule and its rationale is currently under criticism,21 Minnesota
continues to follow it.22 The Florenzano opinion reaffirms this rule by
stating, in dicta, that comparative fault would not apply to an inten-
tional fraud.23
B. Misrepresentation
Minnesota recognizes many forms of actionable misrepresenta-
tion. An exhaustive discussion of each variety is beyond the scope of
this Comment. Since, however, comparative fault is not applied to
intentional torts, 24 the various forms of misrepresentation will be
characterized as either intentional or unintentional for purposes of
considering the comparative fault question.
There is no ambiguity regarding the unintentional nature of negli-
gent misrepresentation.25 Negligent misrepresentation focuses on
the misrepresenter's objective behavior26 and not upon the mis-
19. See, e.g., Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 175; Kelzer v. Wachholz, 381 N.W.2d 852
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis.2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960).
20. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 402 (1941); 38 AM. JUR.
Negligence § 178, at 855 (1941); see also Dear & Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Inten-
tional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 9-11
(1984).
21. See, e.g., Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 20, at 11-20.
22. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
23. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 175. Specifically, the court stated "[w]ithout ques-
tion, principles of comparative negligence would not apply to an intentional tort; we
have never so applied them." Id.
24. See supra note 19.
25. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 176.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). The Restatement sets out
the elements of negligent misrepresentation as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is sub-
ject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1)
is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose bene-
fit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the infor-
mation to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a sub-
stantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
[Vol. 13
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representer's state of mind. Plaintiff must establish that the defend-
ant acted unreasonably in either obtaining or communicating the
information contained in the representation.27 Minnesota adopted
the Restatement (Second) of Torts28 formulation of negligent mis-
representation in Bonhiver v. Graft.29
Intentional misrepresentation or "fraud",3o on the other hand, fo-
cuses on the misrepresenter's subjective knowledge of the truth of
his statement.3 ' Proof of "scienter" or a "fraudulent intent" is a
necessary element of intentional misrepresentation.32 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court, in Davis v. Re-Trac Manufacturing Corp. ,33 identi-
fied two situations in which a fraudulent intent is present: "The
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the
duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect
them.
Id. The comments to this section state that "[t]he reason a narrower scope of liability
is fixed for negligent misrepresentation than for deceit is to be found in the differ-
ence between the obligations of honesty and of care .. I." ld., comment a. Negligent
misrepresentation speaks in terms of "care" which is based upon an objective evalua-
tion of conduct where as "honesty" requires an examination of the misrepresenter's
subjective state of mind. See id.; cf. infra note 31 and accompanying text (which fo-
cuses on intentional misrepresentation or "fraud").
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
28. Id.
29. 311 Minn. 111, 121-22, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-99 (1976).
30. "The terms 'fraud' and 'misrepresentation' have been used interchangeably
in Minnesota law. In general terms, 'fraud' is used when there is an intentional mis-
representation, whereas 'misrepresentation' may be used when the misrepresenta-
tion is unintentional." J.I.G. III at 407 (1986).
31. The Minnesota Supreme Court requires that plaintiffs make the following
showing in order to establish fraud:
1. There must be a representation;
2. That representation must be false;
3. It must have to do with a past or present fact;
4. That fact must be material;
5. It must be susceptible of knowledge;
6. The representer must know it to be false, or in the alternative, must
assert it as of his own knowledge without knowing whether it is true or false;
7. The representer must intend to have the other person induced to act, or
justified in acting upon it;
8. That person must be so induced to act or so justified in acting;
9. That person's action must be in reliance upon the representation;
10. That person must suffer damage;
11. That damage must be attributable to the misrepresentation, that is, the
statement must be the proximate cause of the injury.
Davis v. Re-Trac Mfg. Corp., 276 Minn. 116, 117, 149 N.W.2d 37, 38-39 (1967) (cit-
ing Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1960)). The sixth ele-
ment requires the plaintiff to establish a certain subjective state of mind on the part
of the misrepresenter. This subjective state of mind is referred to as either "fraudu-
lent intent" or "scienter". See Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 173, n.2.
32. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 173 (citing Humphrey v. Merriam, 32 Minn. 197,
198, 20 N.W. 138, 138 (1884)).
33. 276 Minn. 116, 149 N.W.2d 37 (1967).
19871
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representer must know [the statement] to be false, or in the alterna-
tive, must assert [the statement] as of his own knowledge without
knowing whether it is true or false."34 The Davis court's formulation
of fraudulent intent parallels the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 5
Thus, under Davis, actual knowledge of the falsity is not necessar-
ily a requirement for a fraudulent intent. A fraudulent intent is pres-
ent if the misrepresenter knows that he is ignorant of the truth or
falsity of the statement.3 6 This situation presented the Florenzano
court with some difficulty. Justice Simonett wrote a concurring opin-
ion in which he suggested that comparative fault should also apply to
this category of fraudulent misrepresentation. A problem arises be-
tween this suggestion and the rule that comparative fault should not
be applied to intentional torts. This problem is examined below.
II. FLORENZANO V. OLSON
A. Facts
In 1973, the Florenzanos purchased a home.37 "They were
twenty-six year old college graduates, in good health, with one small
child .... Soon after the purchase of their home, the Florenzanos
received a postcard from Olson, an agent of Bankers Life Company,
offering a free gift for the opportunity to meet with them and discuss
mortgage insurance."38 Their first meeting took place in June
1973.39 They discussed mortgage insurance in the form of life insur-
34. Id. at 117, 149 N.W.2d at 39.
35. The Restatement of Torts provides the following formulations of fraudulent
intent or scienter:
Conditions Under Which Misrepresentation Is Fraudulent (Scienter) A mis-
representation is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be,
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation
that he states or implies, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that
he states or implies.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). The comments go on to state:
In order that a misrepresentation may be fraudulent it is not necessary that
the maker know the matter is not as represented. Indeed, it is not necessary
that he should even believe this to be so. It is enough that being conscious
that he has neither knowledge nor belief in the existence of the matter he
chooses to assert it as a fact. Indeed, since knowledge implies a firm convic-
tion, a misrepresentation of a fact so made as to assert that the maker knows
it, is fraudulent if he is conscious that he has merely a belief in its existence
and recognizes that there is a chance, more or less great, that the fact may
not be as it is represented.
Id., comment b.
36. Davis, 267 Minn. at 117, 149 N.W.2d at 39.
37. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 171.
38. Id.
39. Id.
[Vol. 13
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ance for Joe Florenzano.40 At a second meeting with Olson, the
Florenzanos purchased a life insurance policy.4 1
At the second meeting, the Florenzanos also provided Olson with
extensive financial information.42 The information was needed for a
financial analysis, which Olson was preparing for them.43 The finan-
cial analysis was offered free of charge as a sales tool to gain the trust
and confidence of prospective clients. 44 Olson needed to obtain the
Florenzanos' social security earnings records to prepare the analysis,
but he had forgotten the necessary authorization forms, so he met
with them a third time in September.45
The misrepresentations took place at this third meeting. Olson
advised Judie Florenzano that she should take advantage of an op-
portunity to withdraw from her employer's social security pro-
gram.46 Olson advised Florenzano that this was a "once-in-a-
lifetime" opportunity and that they would be "fools" to choose any-
thing but total withdrawal from the social security program. 47 Olson
explained to them that ifJudie Florenzano withdrew, she would still
be covered by her husband's social security contributions.48 This
statement turned out to be wrong and it became the basis for the
Florenzanos' suit against Olson.49
In 1977, Judie Florenzano became totally disabled by multiple
sclerosis.50 Neither she nor her two minor children were eligible for
any social security benefits due to her withdrawal from the pro-
gram.5 1 She brought suit against Olson to recover the present value
of the lost benefits.52
B. The Lower Courts' Holdings
The Florenzanos' suit was presented to the jury on an intentional
misrepresentation theory.53 In returning the verdict, the jury an-
swered "yes" to all questions needed to establish Olson's liability
under an intentional theory.54 A special verdict form was also
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 172.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 170.
52. Id. at 171.
53. Id. at 175.
54. Id.
1987]
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presented to the jury in which they determined that Florenzano was
62.5% negligent and that Olson was only 37.5% negligent.55
The trial court independently determined that the basis of the
Florenzanos' suit was negligent, rather than intentional, misrepre-
sentation.56 Accordingly, the trial judge applied comparative fault to
the claim and denied recovery to the Florenzanos because their fault
exceeded the fault of the defendant.57 The Florenzanos appealed on
the ground that they had pled and proven intentional misrepresenta-
tion and that comparative fault should not have been applied to an
intentional tort.58
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's determination that
comparative fault applies to negligent misrepresentation and re-
manded the case for a new trial.59 The basis for the remand was the
jury's inconsistent and irreconcilable responses to the special verdict
form in which they found the Florenzanos' reliance reasonable, yet
apportioned to them 62.5% of the fault.60 Both parties appealed the
court of appeals' decision.6 ' Florenzano appealed the remand for a
new trial on liability for intentional fraud.62 Olson and Bankers Life
appealed the decision that comparative fault did not apply to the
case. 63
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the judgment of the trial court.64 Since thejury found the
Florenzanos more at fault than Olson-62.5% vs. 37.5%-they re-
covered nothing.65
C. The Supreme Court's Analysis
Much of the supreme court's opinion was devoted to the facts of
the case and to a general discussion of fraud.66 The court agreed
with the trial court that, as a matter of law, the evidence only sup-
ported a claim of negligent, rather than intentional, misrepresenta-
tion.67 The court also reaffirmed the general rule that comparative
55. Id. at 170.
56. Florenzano, 358 N.W.2d at 176.
57. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 170. See also supra note 10 (recovery barred by Min-
nesota Statutes section 604.01 if plaintiff's fault exceeds defendant's).
58. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 170.
59. Florenzano, 358 N.W.2d at 176-77.
60. Id. at 176.
61. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 170.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 176.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 172-74.
67. Id. at 175.
[Vol. 13
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fault would not apply to intentional misrepresentation.68
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' deci-
sion not to apply comparative fault. 69 The opinion of the court of
appeals was rejected, and the supreme court concluded that applying
comparative fault to negligent misrepresentation is consistent with
Minnesota's practice of applying the comparative fault device
expansively.70
III. ANALYSIS
A. Basic Holding
The supreme court's decision to extend comparative fault to negli-
gent misrepresentation is consistent with Minnesota's liberal use of
the comparative fault device.7t This should be evident by looking at
the development of Minnesota's comparative fault law. 72 A contrary
result, however, was reached by the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals held that comparative fault should not apply to
negligent misrepresentation.73 Their decision was based upon two
arguments.
First, the court of appeals held that applying comparative fault to
negligent misrepresentation was unnecessary. 74 Contributory negli-
gence in the misrepresentation context could only take the form of
unreasonable or unjustified reliance upon the misrepresentation.
Since reasonable reliance is an element of any misrepresentation
claim, the court held that a jury question on contributory negligence
would serve no useful purpose:75
To establish liability for fraud, a plaintiff must prove justifiable reli-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 176.
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. Florenzano, 358 N.W.2d at 176.
74. Id.
75. "Reasonable" or "justified" reliance is an element of both intentional and
negligent misrepresentation. See supra notes 31, 35. This requirement would pre-
clude recovery in the situation where, for example, the statement is made by a well-
known habitual liar or where the statement contains obvious exaggerations. Thus,
the reasonable reliance requirement places some burden on the recipient of a false
statement to recognize its falsity and to avoid relying on it.
Since intentional misrepresentation is an intentional tort, contributory negli-
gence is not a defense and the jury will be asked the reasonable reliance question but
not the contributory negligence question. But with negligent misrepresentation, the
jury will be asked the reasonable reliance question and also receive an instruction
asking them to apportion fault among all parties, including the plaintiff. Since the
jury is asked to examine the plaintiff's conduct at two different points-reliance and
apportionment of fault-the potential for conflicting and irreconciliable responses is
apparent. But see Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 178, n.6 (suggesting that justified reliance
1987]
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ance. [Citation omitted] Whether a plaintiff in a fraud action rea-
sonably relied is tantamount to whether a plaintiff in a fraud action
was negligent. A question to the jury relating to plaintiff's reliance
obviates the need for a separate question relating to plaintiff's
fault. 76
Although the court's observation of the overlap between contribu-
tory negligence and justifiable reliance is interesting, it confuses con-
tributory negligence with comparative fault. The court seems to
have misconstrued the issue to be the application of contributory
negligence rather than comparative fault. While there is considera-
ble overlap between the justifiable reliance requirement and the con-
tributory negligence rule, there is no overlap between justifiable
reliance and comparative fault. Contributory negligence and com-
parative fault have different functions.
Contributory negligence, much like the reasonable reliance re-
quirement, focuses on the plaintiff's conduct. If the plaintiff is con-
tributorily negligent, the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff and
the plaintiff recovers nothing. Similarly, if the plaintiff's reliance
upon the misrepresentation is not reasonable, the defendant is not
liable to the plaintiff and plaintiff's recovery is zero. Conversely, if
the plaintiff's reliance is reasonable and if the plaintiff is not guilty of
contributory negligence, the plaintiff will recover all of his or her
damages. This is the "all-or-nothing" problem which comparative
fault addresses 77 and which contributory negligence and the justifi-
able reliance requirement do not. A question to the jury relating to
plaintiff's reliance may obviate the need for a question relating to
contributory negligence but it does not obviate the need to apply
comparative fault.
The court of appeals' second assertion for not applying compara-
tive fault to negligent misrepresentation is based upon the kind of
damages typically involved in misrepresentation claims. The court
borrowed language from a California appellate court decision78 stat-
ing: "application of comparative fault principles, designed to miti-
gate the often catastrophic consequences of personal injury, would
only create unnecessary confusion and complexity in [business]
and contributory negligence focus on different issues). The potential confusion is
apparent in the instant case. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
The confusion created when negligent misrepresentation, along with an instruc-
tion on comparative fault, is sent to the jury could be avoided by deleting the reason-
able reliance requirement from the elements of negligent misrepresentation. The
jury will examine the plaintiff's culpability when it is asked to apportion fault. In
such instances, a separate question as to reliance is duplicative and potentially
confusing.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 12.
78. Carroll v. Gava, 98 Cal. App. 3d 892, 898, 159 Cal. Rptr. 778, 781 (1980).
(Vol. 13
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss3/7
COMPARATIVE FAULT
transactions."7 9 Thus, the appellate court seems to urge that com-
parative fault not be applied where the damages are based upon pe-
cuniary rather than physical harm.
Although this position finds some support in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,80 Minnesota has, in the past, applied comparative
fault to claims involving only pecuniary harm. 8 1 The supreme court
refuses to apply comparative fault to losses based upon a breach of
contract in which plaintiff has lost the benefit of the bargain.82 "[I]f
the case [is] essentially based on a contract theory, fault should not
have been allocated, and an instruction to the contrary would consti-
tute reversible error."8 3
The plaintiffs in Florenzano were not suing to recover something
they bargained for and did not receive. They were suing for losses
caused by a misrepresentation made after their contract had been cre-
ated.84 The misrepresentation, therefore, could not have been the
source of their contractual expectations or the basis of their bargain.
The supreme court rejected the court of appeals' holding and held
that comparative fault applies to negligent misrepresentation, at
least on these facts. This decision appears consistent with the cur-
rent state of the law.
B. Extending Comparative Fault to "Reckless Misrepresentation"
Justice Simonett writes a concurring opinion in which he argues
that comparative fault should also apply to "reckless misrepresenta-
tion."8 5 The concurrence defines a "reckless misrepresentation" as
one in which "the representer asserts a fact as of his own knowledge
without knowing whether it is true or false."86 The argument is
based upon the definition of "fault" in the Comparative Fault Act87
79. Florenzano, 358 N.W.2d at 176-77.
80. A comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
With respect to physical harms caused by negligence, the old rule that con-
tributory negligence is a complete bar to liability based on negligence is
yielding to a trend toward comparative negligence. It is debatable whether
this development should affect liability for pecuniary harm as well. Prece-
dents to date have not made this extension.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522A comment b (1977).
81. See, e.g., Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983) (comparative fault
applied to consequential damages in contract claim; plaintiff's failure to mitigate its
damages was treated as contributory negligence); Mike's Fixtures, Inc. v. Bombard's
Access Floor Systems, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (definition of
"fault" in comparative fault statute does not apply generally to contract actions).
82. See Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 102.
83. Id.
84. See Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 171.
85. Id. at 176-79.
86. Id. at 177, n.2.
87. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1984).
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and upon policy considerations.
The concurring opinion correctly points out that the statutory def-
inition of "fault" includes acts or omissions which are "in any mea-
sure negligent or reckless."88 Comparative fault, then, should apply
to reckless misrepresentation. Although this argument works on the
surface, it is based upon a very questionable use of the term "reck-
less." If "reckless" is the wrong term, the fact that the Comparative
Fault Act expressly includes reckless acts is irrelevant.
The kind of misrepresentations which the concurring opinion re-
fers to as "reckless" have been previously characterized by the
supreme court as intentional. Under Minnesota law, the presence of
a fraudulent intent or scienter makes the misrepresentation an inten-
tional tort.89 In Davis v. Re-Trac Manufacturing Corp.,90 the supreme
court noted that a fraudulent intent is present when the mis-
representer either knows the statement is false or knows that he does
not know whether it is true or false.9t This second formulation of
fraudulent intent is exactly what the concurring opinion now calls
recklessness. Under Davis, then, there is strong support for the posi-
tion that the so-called reckless misrepresentation is really an inten-
tional misrepresentation. Attaching the label of "reckless" should
not control the issue.
Since the definitions are not dispositive, the question should be
approached by looking at the nature of the so-called reckless misrep-
resentation. If the reckless misrepresentation is really more akin to
an intentional tort, comparative fault should not apply. 92
The concurrence argues that "deceit" is the only "true" inten-
tional misrepresentation.9g Deceit involves a misrepresentation in
which the misrepresenter knows the statement is false.94
In my view, comparative responsibility would apply to both reckless
and negligent misrepresentation but not to deceit. The dividing
line is the "intent to deceive" which distinguishes deceit from the
other two torts and which makes deceit a true, not a fictional, inten-
tional tort.95
The concurrence is arguing that an "intent to deceive" makes a mis-
representation an intentional tort. When the misrepresenter does
88. See Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 177, n.4 (emphasis added); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 604.01, subd. la (1984).
89. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 173 (citing Humphrey, 32 Minn. at 198, 20 N.W. at
138 (1884)).
90. 276 Minn. 116, 149 N.W.2d 37 (1967).
91. Id. at 117, 149 N.W.2d at 39.
92. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (comparative fault does not apply to
intentional torts).
93. See Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 177.
94. Id. at 177, n.l.
95. Id. at 177.
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not know the statement is false, strictly speaking, there can be no in-
tent to deceive. Since the reckless misrepresenter does not know the
statement is false,96 there is no intent to deceive and the tort is not
intentional.
This argument ignores one aspect of the reckless misrepresention.
Not only does the reckless misrepresenter make a statement without
knowing whether it is true, but he also "asserts it as of his own
knowledge."9 7 Thus, the reckless misrepresenter makes a statement
knowing it may well be false, and also asserts it as if he knows it to be
true. He, therefore, "intends to deceive" the plaintiff as to his level
of confidence in the statement. There is a deliberate and affirmative
act of deception which should indicate that "reckless" is a misnomer
and that this kind of misrepresentation should properly be character-
ized as an intentional tort.
Finally, the concurrence draws on policy considerations to support
its position:
[A] deceiver's conduct is different in kind from the reckless or neg-
ligent misrepresentation, more reprehensible, and it would be 'bad
policy' to let the deceiver ameliorate his deception by urging that
his victim should share the harm which the deceiver alone chose to
create. 98
The concurrence continues by stating: "The same policy arguments
against applying comparable responsibility do not apply to reckless
and negligent misrepresentations."99
It is true that there is a slight difference between deceit and reck-
less misrepresentation but the difference is insignificant. It is not at
all clear why the policy arguments against applying comparative fault
to one are not equally relevant to the other. Both involve deliberate
deception,100 both require scienter,01 and, in both cases, the ele-
ments of proof focus on the defendant's subjective state of mind.
The only difference is the misrepresenter's certainty regarding the
falsity of the statement. 0 2 If it is bad policy to allow the deceiver to
ameliorate his deception by urging the victim to share the harm, it is
also bad policy to allow the "reckless" misrepresenter to do the
same.
As previously mentioned, there are writers currently criticizing the
rule that comparative fault should not apply to intentional torts.103
96. See id. at 177, n.2.
97. See id; see also Davis, 276 Minn. at 117, 149 N.W.2d at 39.
98. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 178.
99. Id.
100. See supra text accompanying note 97.
101. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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The criticism is limited to certain kinds of intentional torts and, gen-
erally speaking, it appears the position is in a developmental
stage. 0 4 Rather than arguing that intentional torts are qualitatively
different from negligent acts, these writers take the position that the
difference is only one of quantitative degree.105 If it is desireable to
apply comparative fault to intentional misrepresentation, the debate
should focus on this underlying issue and not upon attempts to re-
characterize certain forms of misrepresentation as unintentional to
achieve the application of comparative fault.
CONCLUSION
With the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Florenzano v. Ol-
son, Minnesota courts will now be applying comparative fault to
claims for negligent misrepresentation. Only when plaintiff's per-
centage of fault exceeds the defendant's, will contributory negli-
gence defeat plaintiff's recovery. The decision is consistent with
Minnesota's expansive use of the comparative responsibility device
and with Minnesota's pronouncements regarding the nature of negli-
gent misrepresentation.
As the law currently stands, comparative fault should not apply to
any misrepresentation made with scienter. The supreme court's pre-
vious statements regarding fraudulent intent, and general considera-
tions of public policy argue against any further application of
comparative fault in the area of misrepresentation. There is no rea-
son to further confuse the area of fraud and misrepresentation by
creating new distinctions between the various forms of intentional
misrepresentation.
Michael A. Koziol
104. Id.
105. Id.
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